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Creditor’s Inability to Set Aside a Judicial Foreclosure Sale Despite 
Gross Underbidding 
Amalgamated Bank v Superior Court (2007)  
149 CA4th 1003, 57 CR3d 686 
Real property claimant must establish probable validity of claim in order to vacate postjudgment 
order expunging lis pendens. 
As judgment creditor on real property owned by Winncrest, Pension Trust Fund for 
Operating Engineers and its corporate cotrustee, Amalgamated Bank (collectively, PTF), 
requested the county sheriff to issue a writ of sale to execute on the property and sell it to 
the highest bidder (subject to the mortgagor’s right of redemption). The property was 
worth approximately $6.5 million. PTF intended to bid at the public auction but did not 
do so because its designated bidders, delayed in traffic, did not arrive until after the 
property was sold to Palmbaum for $2000. Winncrest did not exercise its right of 
redemption within the one-year redemption period. 
PTF sued to set aside the foreclosure sale for irregularities and recorded a notice of lis 
pendens. The trial court granted Palmbaum summary judgment, concluding that PTF was 
barred from setting aside the sale. While PTF’s appeal was pending, Palmbaum 
successfully moved to expunge the lis pendens. PTF petitioned for writ of mandate to 
stay the expungement order. The court of appeal granted an alternative writ and stayed 
the expungement order pending resolution of the petition. 
The court of appeal denied the writ. It first concluded that its stay of the expungement 
order was superfluous because, under CCP §405.35, a stay upon filing a petition for writ 
of mandate is automatic; the expungement order is not effective until the writ proceeding 
is finally adjudicated. 
Code of Civil Procedure §405.32 requires a court to order the expungement of a notice 
of lis pendens if it finds “that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the 
evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.” Code of Civil Procedure 
§405.3 defines “probable validity” as “more likely than not” that the claimant will prevail 
against the defendant in the action. The code comment to §405.32 states that it was 
intended to disapprove cases that held that the court on a motion to expunge may not 
conduct a mini-trial on the merits of the case, and to change the law to require judicial 
evaluation of the merits. 
The language of §405.32 is plainly targeted at motions to expunge before trial, not 
expungement motions made after judgment has been entered and while an appeal is 
pending. In Mix v Superior Court (2004) 124 CA4th 987, 21 CR3d 826, the court held 
that a trial court presented with an expungement motion after judgment against the 
claimant must apply the probable validity standard and may deny the motion only if the 
court believes that its own decision will be reversed on appeal. The trial court did not err 
in granting the expungement motion. 
In deciding a writ petition under CCP §405.39, after judgment and pending appeal, an 
appellate court must also assess whether the underlying real property claim has probable 
validity, i.e., whether it is more likely than not the real property claim will prevail at the 
end of the appellate process. The appellate court will conduct a prima facie review of the 
probable success of the underlying appeal, a mini-review that is not equivalent to a full-
scale resolution of the underlying appeal. Summary denial of a writ petition does not 
constitute law of the case requiring the appellate court to decide the appeal against the 
real property claimant. 
PTF had no standing to bring an action to rescind the judicial foreclosure sale. Under 
CCP §701.680(c)(1), which applies to judicial foreclosure sales, including those subject 
to a right of redemption, only the judgment debtor can set aside the sale for irregularity 
and only if the purchaser was the judgment creditor. Here, the property was sold to 
Palmbaum, a third party; he became the fee owner, subject only to the right of 
redemption. Because Winncrest did not bring an action to set aside the sale or exercise its 
right of redemption within the statutory time frames, Palmbaum’s title to the property 
was perfected. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: From a systems point of view, one should approve this decision as 
showing that deadlines really are meaningful and apply to creditors as well as lenders. On 
the other hand, from a common-sense or equity point of view, one should say it is insane to 
reject an attempt to set aside a foreclosure of collateral that was worth between $6 million 
and $10 million but was sold for only $2000 because the lender was held up in a traffic jam 
and showed up at the sale a minute late, and had its attempt to enter a bid thereupon 
rejected. (I confess to some bias in this analysis, having been involved in this case at some 
of its stages.) 
Both the trial and the appellate court decisions are based on pure formalism: the trial 
court’s summary judgment against undoing the sale on the ground that judicial foreclosure 
sales are statutorily invulnerable from attack, regardless of merits; and the appellate court’s 
refusal to issue a writ undoing expungement of the lis pendens, despite its disclaimer that 
the merits of the case had not been decided. Both results have great appeal as policies that 
should be generally supported, but at the same time they generate considerable doubt as to 
the wisdom of their application in this particular case. 
1. As to the summary judgment, the foreclosure sale was upheld because CCP §701.680 
provides that a judicial foreclosure is “absolute and may not be set aside for any reason” 
except in an attack made by the judgment debtor (not the creditor, as here). But despite this 
statute saying that foreclosure sales are absolute, CCP §726 provides at the same time that 
they are subject to rights of postsale redemption whenever a deficiency judgment can be 
rendered. Since “absolute” is supposed to mean “not subject to redemption” (Yancey v Fink 
(1991) 226 CA3d 1334, 1350, 227 CR 415), there clearly has to be a carve-out for sales, 
such as this one, when a deficiency judgment was sought if both §§726 and 701.680 are to 
be respected. 
When §701.680(a) then also says that the sale “may not be set aside for any reason,” is 
that subject to the same carve-out, or are the two clauses in the section to be treated 
differently? Since the policy behind this section is to give sales more finality, in order to 
encourage bidding at them, is any additional finality gained by making a sale immune to 
attack when it is already subject to redemption? Would a prospective bidder offer more in 
one case than in the other? When a sale is truly “absolute” (not subject to redemption), then 
“finality” (invulnerability to attack) is a meaningful companion, but what good does 
invulnerability do when there can be a redemption anyway? It does not seem very likely to 
me that the legislature truly wanted to bar judicial attacks on sales that were already subject 
to statutory redemption. 
I can understand having what seems like a logically absurd principle if it did a party some 
good, but that does not seem to be the case. Denying the creditor an opportunity to vacate 
the sale so that it can enter a higher bid certainly does not help the debtor, who only loses 
the prospect of the deficiency judgment being reduced by virtue of a higher bid (if it 
exceeded fair value). Nor does it help junior creditors, who, like the debtor, lose the 
opportunity to receive any surplus from a higher bid. It clearly hurts the selling creditor, 
whose deficiency recovery remains limited by fair value regardless of how little was bid. 
Only the third party bidder comes out a winner. (Unless the trustor then redeems, and it is 
certainly puzzling why there was no redemption here, when it would have taken only $2000 
to reacquire property worth $6 million to $10 million.) 
I have written previously about my misgivings as to making the fall of the hammer the 
crucial last moment of the sale, as opposed to the delivery or the recordation of the trustee’s 
or sheriff’s deed. See Midcourse Correction, Setting Aside Foreclosure Sales, 24 CEB 
RPLR 80 (Mar. 2001), and my Editor’s Take (26 CEB RPLR 161 (July 2003)) on Residential 
Capital, LLC v Cal-W. Reconveyance Corp. (2003) 108 CA4th 807, 134 CR2d 162. I think 
either party—debtor or creditor—whose objection is publicly made before the selling official 
has accepted the bidder’s money and delivered the deed to the bidder should have standing 
to make that protest in court even though the hammer had already fallen, but that does not 
appear to be the rule. 
2. With regard to expunging the lis pendens, the court of appeal applied similar policy 
notions: Notices of pendency have to be readily expungeable in order to keep them from 
being frivolously or abusively filed. As with foreclosure sale finality, I think that is an 
admirable policy, but only when and if it serves some appropriate purpose. 
By permitting this lis pendens to be expunged when the merits have yet to be decided, 
this lender—even if it prevails—will recover nothing. Even if the debtor is not a single-asset 
judgment-proof entity, the lender’s deficiency judgment will be calculated according to the 
$6 million to $10 million fair value, rather than the $2000 bid, allowing all of the rest in 
between those numbers to escape. Even if the lender’s arguments on the merits are upheld, 
the sale cannot be undone if title was transferable to a BFP because of the expungement, 
and such a transfer did occur. The bidder will have sold for $6 million what it purchased for 
$2000, and it will take some pretty imaginative theorizing for the lender to find a way to 
reach into its pocket and retrieve that profit. Once the lis pendens is expunged, the 
foreclosure purchaser can capture the kind of resale profit that was sought and lost in 
Residential Capital, supra, regardless of whatever happens on the merits. 
The probable validity test that the court of appeal applies seems generally an appropriate 
standard. But nowhere in it is any consideration given to the potential harm that can result if 
expungement is permitted at the preliminary stage and then regretted at the final stage. 
Again, efficiency beats equity.—Roger Bernhardt 
 
